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Whether the neuronal encoding of number is linear
or logarithmic divides cognitive neuroscientists
working on mathematical cognition. Recordings
from the prefrontal cortex of the monkey support the
logarithmic hypothesis. Similarities between number
and the coding of other quantities are also beginning
to become apparent.
We humans are fond of lauding our cognitive abilities
and have long sought to use them to distinguish man
from other animals. One of the first capacities
identified as special to humans was that of reason,
and especially mathematical ability. This early conceit
is now a casualty of recent single unit recordings from
the prefrontal cortex of non-human primates, which
show that the representation of numerical quantity
obeys the same psychophysical constraints as other
sensory and magnitude systems. Studies of the single
units, or ‘numerons’, which respond to numerical
quantity suggest that the cognitive representation of
number may be closely linked to that of other
magnitudes, such as size and time.
Our ability to manipulate numbers or quantities may
seem to be one of the most complex of human
achievements but, as with all our other abilities, there
are precedents, or rather parallels, in other species.
When it comes to counting or assessing whether an
amount of something is more than or less than some
other amount, birds do it [1], bees definitely do it [2]
and, although I cannot provide a reference, my money
is also on educated fleas being able to do it. Knowing
how much  food there is (estimated quantity), how far
away it is (distance), how long it will take to get there
(time) and how many competitors (specific quantity)
also want the food are all important factors that
require magnitude estimation of some sort [3].
Humans can of course carry out explicit
computations that are beyond the capabilities of other
species, but behavioural studies show that our basic
quantity functions obey the same rules as those of
other animals. The best worked examples of this are in
the time domain: our ability to discriminate between
two intervals of time exhibits a Weber function [4], as
does our ability to discriminate between two numbers
[5]. This raises the question of whether the neural
instantiation of quantities — of whatever type, number,
size or time — shows the logarithmic compression dis-
played in behaviour, or whether some more abstract,
symbolic code is used to represent them. As Nieder
and Miller [6] point out in a recent paper, the answer to
the question has important consequences, because
some theories of cognitive processing are dependent
on the existence of propositional, symbolic represen-
tations which are independent of the sensory qualities
of the stimuli.
To investigate the neural coding of number, Nieder
and Miller [6] trained monkeys to carry out delayed
non-match to sample (DNMS) numerosity judgements.
In the DNMS paradigm, the monkeys were shown a
sample of some number of dots, followed by a delay
and two successive presentations of other quantities
of dots. One of these two presentations contained the
same number of dots as the sample, and the other a
different number of dots. The monkeys’ task was to
release a lever in response to the display containing
the different number of dots (the non-match). The
stimuli were controlled for other cues that could have
been used by the monkeys, such as spatial extent of
the group of dots, spatial organisation and individual
dot size; the monkeys could only base their judge-
ments on numerosity. 
The monkeys’ behavioural performance showed
two important features. They were more accurate in
making their judgements when the difference between
non-matching numerosities was greater. This is known
as the ‘numerical distance effect’ and amounts to
finding the difference between 1 and 10 easier to spot
than the difference between 9 and 10. The monkeys
also required a greater distance between two
numerosities as the quantities being discriminated
increased. This is called the ‘numerical size effect’: the
difference between 9 and 10 is proportionally greater
than the difference between 99 and 100, although in
both cases the absolute difference is 1.
So a monkey’s perception of quantity, like that of a
human, has a compressive quality reminiscent of that
of the perception of other stimuli, such as luminance,
size, weight and so on. Nieder and Miller [6] formalised
this by plotting the behavioural performances on linear
and log scales and by calculating goodness of fit func-
tions using linear, power and logarithmic scaling. The
power and log functions gave better fits to the data
than linear schemes. The conclusion thus far reached
by Nieder and Miller [6] is that monkeys’ discrimination
of numerosity follows the Weber-Fechner law.
The crux of the experiment lay in recording from
neurons in the prefrontal cortex as the monkeys made
these discriminations: would the neurons provide
similar evidence of a compressive encoding of number?
The ‘behaviour’ of the neurons was a remarkably good
fit for the behaviour of the monkeys: the responses of
these numerons were also best described by plotting
the data logarithmically, and this was true whether the
responses were analysed during the presentation of the
sample or during the delay period between the sample
and the potential non-matches. Goodness of fit mea-
sures were also better for log and power schemes than
for linear, though only slightly. Indeed, if there were no
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hypothesis or debate about the coding scheme, the
adequacy of the linear goodness of fit would not be
unimpressive; it is not as if the linear fits are random,
and the question of why they approximate the data at
all remains to be answered. 
The prefrontal cortex is not the only location from
which numerons have been recorded. Sawamura et al.
[7] recorded from area 7a in the parietal cortex of the
macaque and reported neurons selective for numeri-
cal quantity. Monkeys were required to make a fixed
number of arm movements and the cellular responses
correlated with the target number. These data are
important because, in humans, it is the parietal cortex
rather than the prefrontal cortex that seems to be the
centre of quantity processing [8]. It is patients with
parietal damage who show the most severe and
widest range of deficits in estimating and using infor-
mation about quantity. 
We have to ask, then, what is it that the parietal and
prefrontal cortex have in common, and is numerical
quantity special in some way — because it is abstract
— or just another example of a magnitude? The con-
nections between the parietal and prefrontal cortex
have been shown to be the basis of spatial memory
functions in the dorsal region of the prefrontal cortex
[9], and it may very well be space that is the linking
theme in the common response to numerosity of cells
in these two regions.
Space and number may not be the only link,
however. The parietal cortex is the hub of several
functions that rely on estimating magnitudes of one
type or another. In addition to spatial computations
coded in action coordinates [10] (such as “how far to
reach?”), the parietal cortex is also important for
numerosity estimation (“how many”), temporal judge-
ments [11] (“how fast is X?” requires an answer if one
is to reach to a moving object) and size judgements
(“how big or how much?”).
The correspondence between the regions of cortex
involved in number, space, time and size processing
— magnitudes — is intriguing. To give one example, a
study [12] on non-human primates has addressed the
question of cortical processing of duration. Onoe et al.
[12] trained monkeys to make temporal discrimination
tasks — which duration is longer/shorter? — while
they underwent PET scanning. The two key cortical
areas activated in temporal discrimination were dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex and area 7a of the parietal
lobe — the same areas showing number and spatial
properties in the single unit studies discussed above.
Onoe et al. [12] went on to show that loss of dorsolat-
eral prefrontal neurons caused by bicuculline resulted
in a deficit on the temporal discrimination task. The
authors suggest that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
may be important in maintaining the duration of the
reference time in temporal discrimination, and that
area 7a “may play a role in relaying information about
the chronometric dimension of a stimulus, at least
when it is derived from a visual target”.
Thus, a summary of non-human primate studies
shows that two brain areas that have undisputed roles
in spatial perception and spatial memory also contain
neurons selective for numerical quantity and temporal
duration. Onoe et al.’s [12] conclusion regarding the
correspondence of spatial and temporal response
properties of parietal neurons was that “the temporal
information in these regions may be coded in neurons
with multiplex properties and/or in cell assemblies with
overlapping connections in the same region”. Adding
numerical quantity to the mix would seem to be a small
step in the light of the findings of Nieder and Miller [6]
and Sawamura et al. [7]. This was actually predicted, in
anatomical terms at least, by Dehaene and colleagues
[8], who wrote that “an evolutionary precursor to
number processing in primates, if it exists, might be
found in the anterior part of area LIP, the dorsal sec-
tions of 7a, 7b or the intermediate area PFG”.
The precursor to number, the most impressive of our
magnitude systems, may be the systems encoding
magnitudes that have immediate motor consequences
— how far to reach, how big, how much stuff, how long
before that object reaches here? It is important to
know whether the numerons that respond to exact
quantity are the same ones, or anatomically overlap
with, those that respond to the other forms of magni-
tude. The brain can be lazy — when it finds one solu-
tion to a problem it tends to recycle the solution in
other domains; having graduated in estimating
quantities for action in time and space, it would be par-
simonious for an evolving explicit number sense to
hitch a ride on these magnitude scales.
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